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Review of Metaphysics, to appear
Properties have been supposed to exist for several compelling reasons.1
They  solve  the  problem  of  “the  one  over  many”:  how  different  individuals  can,
objectively, resemble one another in some respect, such as color.  Two pens may be of
exactly the same shade of red, or two electrons may be of exactly the same mass.  That is
explained by there being something,  a universal,  that  is  exactly  the same and wholly
present in both particulars.  It is not just a matter of falling under the same concept: two
objects could both be truly “not green” without there being a universal “not-green”.  Only
where there is a genuine shared reality is there a universal in common.2
Admitting the reality of properties allows direct and literal talk about them, as seems
to be needed to make sense of statements like “Red resembles orange more than blue.”3
That is a statement about colors, not about the particular things that have the colors – or if
it is about the things, it is only about them in respect of their color: red things resemble
orange things but not blue things in respect of their color.  There is no way to avoid
reference to the colors themselves.
1 Introductions to realist views on universals in Chris Swoyer and Francesco Orilia, “Properties,” Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy  (1999, revised 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/; James 
Porter Moreland, Universals (Chesham: Acumen, 2001), ch. 1; David M. Armstrong, Sketch for a 
Systematic Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon, 2010), ch. 2.
2 Michael Tooley, Causation: A Realist Approach (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), 8-9.
3 Arthur Pap, “Nominalism, empiricism and universals: I,” Philosophical Quarterly 9 (1959), 330-40; 
discussion in Tooley, Causation, 10-13.
And in science we quantify over properties (again in ways very hard to paraphrase
away)  when  we  say,  for  example,  “No  acquired  characteristics  are  inherited”  or
“Arguments from analogy involve the inference that individuals sharing some properties
are likely to share others.”  Scientific laws are typically expressed as relations between
properties,  such as the proportionality  of gravitational  force to mass.  Philosophy too
often  speaks,  it  seems  literally,  of  a  complex  realm  of  first-order  and  higher-order
properties and relations and the relations among those, such as the range of determinates
of a determinable.4  
It  was  once  common to postulate  properties  also  for  semantic  reasons,  to  provide
person-independent meanings for words.  That would make the existence of properties
subject to human acts and would result in a huge number of them, as any increase in
vocabulary would create more.  That is contrary to the sparse conception of properties
that arises from a scientific perspective, and for that reason arguments for properties that
begin with language have receded into the background.  On the other hand, language is
part  of  nature  and  intended  to  convey  knowledge  about  nature,  so  it  could  still  be
speculated  that,  for  the  example,  the  subject-predicate  structure  of  basic  sentences  is
useful for communication because it reflects the particular-property structure of reality.
Nominalism denies the reality of properties, holding that they are merely words, or
concepts, or classes.  Arguments against it are well-developed and will not be repeated
here.5
Once the reality of properties is admitted, there are two fundamentally different realist
theories of properties.  Platonist or transcendent realism holds that properties are abstract
objects  in  the  (post-Fregeanly)  classical  sense,  of  being  non-mental,  non-spatial  and
causally inefficacious.6  For present purposes, the Platonism meant is the “extreme” or
“full-blooded”  Platonism  normally  discussed  in  the  philosophy  of  mathematics,7
4 Stephanie Gibbons and Catherine Legg, “Higher-order one-many problems in Plato’s Philebus and recent 
Australian metaphysics,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2013), 119-38.
5 Arguments against various forms of nominalism are given in D.avid M. Armstrong, Universals and 
Scientific Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), vol. 1 chs 2-5.
6 Gideon Rosen, “Abstract objects,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2012), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/ 
7 Variously called “objects Platonism” (Geoffrey Hellman, Mathematics Without Numbers, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989, 3), “standard Platonism” (Colin Cheyne & Charles R. Pigden, “Pythagorean 
powers,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74 (1996), 639-45); “full-blooded Platonism” (Mark 
Balaguer, Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 3, 5; 
Greg Restall, “Just what is full-blooded Platonism?,” Philosophia Mathematica 11 (2003), 82-91); 
“ontological Platonism” (Mark Steiner, “Platonism and the causal theory of knowledge,” Journal of 
Philosophy 70 (1973), 57-66), “traditional Platonism” (Penelope  Maddy, Realism in Mathematics, Oxford: 
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according to which Platonic Forms are strictly denizens of an acausal and abstract world
outside of space and time.  (Plato’s own Platonism may have been more nuanced.)  We
could  know about  that  world,  if  at  all,  only  by  some kind  of  inference  to  the  best
explanation or by a non-perceptual  intellectual  faculty.8  Arguments against  Platonism
have had over two millennia to mature and are also well-developed.9
By  contrast,  Aristotelian or  moderate realism  takes  properties  to  be  literally
instantiated in things (physical particulars or whatever other particular things may exist).
An apple’s color and shape are as real and physical as the apple itself.
The most direct reason for taking an Aristotelian realist view of properties is that we
perceive them.  We perceive an individual apple, but only as a certain shape, color and
weight, because it is those properties of it that confer on it the power to affect our senses.
It  is  in virtue  of being blue  that  a  body reflects  certain  light  and looks blue.   Since
“causality is the mark of being”, the properties that confer causal power are real.  And
that means a reality, not in a Platonic and acausal world of “abstract objects”, but in the
ordinary concrete world in which we live.10
On an Aristotelian view, it is the business of science to determine which properties
there are and to classify and understand the properties we perceive (and those which we
infer to explain what we perceive), and to find the laws connecting them.11
1.
Uninstantiated properties?   Of the many puzzles raised by admitting the reality of
properties,  a  particularly  intractable  yet  important  one  is  the  status  of  uninstantiated
properties – those properties that could be instantiated, but happen not to be.12  For the
Oxford University Press, 1992, 21).
8 Mark Colyvan, The Indispensability of Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), ch. 3; 
Øystein  Linnebo, “Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(2009, revised 2011).
9 Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, vol. 1 ch. 7.
10 This argument is denied in Marcus Giaquinto, “Russell on knowledge of universals by acquaintance,” 
Philosophy 87 (2012), 497-508, on the grounds that it would imply that if we feel a table whose roughness 
is identical to that of Abraham Lincoln’s table, we have felt the roughness of Lincoln’s table without having
felt that table. But the point of universals is that they are multiply instantiated: type-identical roughnesses 
confer the type-identical causal powers on different particulars, which lead to type-identical perceptions, 
but of the roughnesses of different objects.
11 David M. Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
12 Swoyer and Orilia, “Properties,” section 5.
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Platonist, they are not a problem: since properties are abstract and pre-exist the physical
world in any case, uninstantiated properties are the typical case, and the problem rather is
to explain the relation that such distant beings could have to the physical world and to
human  knowledge.   But  for  Aristotelian  realists,  who  start  from  instantiated  and
perceived properties,  uninstantiated properties are a serious problem.  Should they be
granted any sort of reality, or not?
The  problem  is  urgent  because  science  appears  to  speak  freely  of  very  many
uninstantiated properties.  Contemporary chemistry, in particular, with its focus on design
of new compounds, is very interested in the properties of possible compounds that do not
and may never  exist.   The 1700 articles  that  have so far  appeared  in  the  Journal  of
Computer-Aided  Molecular  Design discuss  compounds  that  may  or  may not  ever  be
synthesized, while much of the initial research into possible new drugs aims to find those
that are suboptimal so as not to waste time on making them.13
 And mathematics is even more concerned with the uninstantiated, since mathematics
regularly  advances  truths  or  alleged  truths  about  huge  finite  and  infinite  sets  and
numbers, which are possibly not realized in the physical world and perhaps cannot be
realized due to physical limitations.  That has often been taken to favor Platonism and to
rule out an Aristotelian realist  philosophy of mathematics,  which would hold that the
objects of mathematics – such properties as symmetry, continuity and order – are realized
in the physical world, so that mathematics is a science of aspects of the world, as much as
biology  is.14  The  principal  objection  to  that  thesis  is,  “Some  of  the  objects  of
mathematics are  not realized in the physical world, such as large infinite numbers.”  It
may be that the world is finite, in which case infinite numbers and very large lengths are
not  instantiated  in  the real  world.   Even more so the higher  infinities:  “set  theory is
committed to the existence of infinite sets that are so huge that they simply dwarf garden
variety infinite sets, like the set of all the natural numbers.  There is just no plausible way
to interpret this talk of gigantic infinite sets as being about physical objects.”15  Or as
Stewart Shapiro writes, 
13 Richard B. Silverman and Mark W. Holladay, The Organic Chemistry of Drug Design and Drug Action 
(3rd ed, San Diego: Academic Press, 2014), section 1.3; see also Evan H. Appelman, “Nonexistent 
compounds: two case histories,” Accounts of Chemical Research 6 (4) (1973), 113-7. In biology see George
M. Church and Edward Regis, Regenesis: How synthetic biology will reinvent nature and ourselves (New 
York: Basic Books, 2012).
14 Defended in James Franklin, An Aristotelian Realist Philosophy of Mathematics: Mathematics as the 
Science of Quantity and Structure (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Andrew D. Irvine, ed, 
Physicalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990).
4
It  seems reasonable  to  insist  that  there  is some limit  to  the size  of  the physical
universe. If so, then any branch of mathematics that requires an ontology larger
than that of the physical universe must leave the realm of physical objects if these
branches  are  not  to  be  doomed  to  vacuity.   Even  with  arithmetic,  it  is
counterintuitive for an account of mathematics to be held hostage to the size of the
physical universe.16
What account could an Aristotelian realist account of properties give of mathematical
truths about that vast realm of (probably) unrealized quantities?
The problem of uninstantiated properties needs very careful treatment.   It will be
argued that Aristotelian realism does have an answer to the problem, but it requires a
“semi-Platonist”  Aristotelianism  which  makes  some  concessions  to  Platonism.   The
resulting theory is, however, very far from standard Platonism and cannot be reconciled
with it.
2.
A  tension:  this-worldly  and  contingent,  or  semi-Platonist?  The  reasons
advanced above for admitting properties contain a tension, difficult to reconcile, between
those which suggest a minimalist, this-worldly, instantiated, sparse and contingent view
of properties, and those that point to an opposite, maximalist, near-Platonist conception.17
In particular, if one relies on the “causal power” argument from perception of properties,
then since uninstantiated properties ex hypothesi have no effect, is hard to see why they
should be believed to be real.18  For (putative) particulars, if we fail to observe any causal
effect of them, we conclude they do not exist; why not the same for properties?  From
this point of view, properties should be few in number and should be contingent beings,
their existence established with difficulty by empirical science.
On the other hand, part of the point of properties is to open our eyes to a world of
objective, apparently necessary truths that can go beyond the immediate physical world
15 Mark Balaguer, “Fictionalism in the philosophy of mathematics,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(1999, revised 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ 
16 Stewart Shapiro, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and ontology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 86.
17 The distinction between these two paths laid out in Chris Swoyer, “Theories of properties: from plenitude
to paucity,” Noûs 30 (Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives 10) (1996), 243-64.
18 David M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997), 41-3.
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(even if they are partially realized in it).  The betweenness relations between colors seem
to be necessary – surely there is no possible world in which orange is between blue and
green? – and the fact of those relations seems capable of surviving the destruction of
some, perhaps all, colored things.  Consider this thought experiment: all colored things
fade to a shade of grey – after a certain time everything is grey.  Now suppose that the
history of the universe up to that time is deleted.  So at no time does there exist anything
but grey.  Are the betweenness relations between (non-grey) colors still necessary truths
in that universe?  It seems that they are, since that universe differs from ours only by a
succession  of  contingent  events,  which  should  be  incapable  of  changing  relations
between universals.  If we run the thought experiment in reverse, from the grey world to
ours,  the  true  counterfactuals  about  color  betweenness  would  stand  ready  to  be
instantiated (and only in one possible way) as things became colored.  Similarly with
ratios.  Even  if  the  world  is  in  fact  finite  and  very  large  ratios  of  lengths  are  not
instantiated, it seems that three times any ratio would lie between two and four times that
ratio.  We seem to be dealing with a realm that is, as Plato said, “always one and the
same,  admitting  neither  of  generation  nor  destruction”.19  What  is  the  truthmaker,  or
fundamentum in re, of those counterfactuals?  A minimalist Aristotelianism20 such as that
of Armstrong, which admits only instantiated, contingent properties, will have difficulty
answering that question.  (We will look at Armstrong’s attempted answer later.)
The tension is visible too in considerations about infinite cardinals, suggesting that
while  the natural  instinct  to  adopt  a  fully  Platonist  account  of those massive entities
should be resisted, so should the opposite extreme of taking all mathematical properties
to  be  instantiated.   It  would  be  too  swift  to  demand,  as  Platonists  do:  “Even  if  the
Aristotelian could give an account of small number, ratios etc, how could he deal with the
huge  and  uninstantiated  ones?”   Compare  someone  who  responded  to  the  claim
“Perception gives knowledge” with the objection “Even if perception gives knowledge
about some things, how could it explain knowledge of the unobserved?”  A fair question,
but let us stop and smell the roses first.  Small finite structures have plenty to keep the
mathematician occupied, and the body of knowledge about them is extensive.  If it were
admitted that those truths were literally true of mundane reality, then there would be a
large  body  of  Aristotelian  mathematical  knowledge,  in  no  need  of  Platonist
19 Plato, Philebus 15b2-4.
20 In the language of Swoyer and Orilia, section 5.
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reinterpretation.   If  then  the  world  did  expand  so  that  the  boundary  between  the
instantiated and the uninstantiated blew out infinitely, perhaps to the higher infinities,
most  of  mathematical  knowledge  might  be  literally  true  of  the  (non-abstract)  world.
Nevertheless, as things stand, many mathematical properties – such as infinite cardinals –
could be instantiated but probably aren’t, although there are true facts about them.  That
pushes Aristotelian realism in a maximalist direction, without driving it to full-fledged
Platonism.
A semi-Platonist version of Aristotelianism can thus make sense of two conflicting
intuitions  about  the  objectivity  of  mathematics,  which  create  difficulties  for  other
theories.  On the one hand, its Aristotelian aspect allows it to connect the objectivity of
mathematics  with  the  usual  objectivity  of  science  arising  from  perception  and
measurement: a mathematical property such as the symmetry of a physical object, for
example,  can  be  perceived  (even  by  animals  as  simple  as  bees21),  quantities  can  be
counted and measured, the ratio of your height to mine can be estimated “by eye” if we
stand next to each other.22  That is because symmetry and quantitative properties like
length  are  genuinely  instantiated  in  reality  and can  cause  perceptual  and measurable
knowledge  of  themselves  in  the  ordinary  way  of  science.   On  the  other  hand,  pure
mathematics is rightly felt to cantilever our knowledge out beyond perceptible reality,
and to give us insight into realms of necessities that may well not be instantiated in the
actual  world.   As Armstrong puts it,  “in mathematics,  we gain knowledge of entities
which are merely possible, and indeed, perhaps nomically impossible … there can be no
question  of  establishing  these  conclusions  a posteriori …  Mathematical  ‘existence’,
then, is the possibility of actual existence.”23 
Those opposing sources of mathematical objectivity must be compatible despite their
apparent tension, since sometimes it happens that pure mathematics discovers structures
whose  applicability  is  unsuspected,  followed  by  scientists’ discovery  that  those  very
structures  describe  some  aspect  of  reality.   (Einstein’s  use  of  esoteric  aspects  of
differential  geometry  in  general  relativity  is  one  of  many celebrated  cases.24)   Semi-
Platonist Aristotelianism explains the metaphysics underlying these different aspects of
21 Martin Giurfa, Birgit Eichmann and Randolf Menzel, “Symmetry perception in an insect,” Nature, 382 
(1996), 458-61.
22 Franklin, An Aristotelian Realist Philosophy of Mathematics, introduction.
23 Armstrong, Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, 126.
24 Abraham Pais, Subtle Is the Lord: The science and the life of Albert Einstein (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1982), 210-213.
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the objectivity of mathematics.  The same mathematical properties may be instantiated
(hence  perceptible  and  measurable)  or  uninstantiated  and  merely  possible  (hence
accessible, if at all, by some other, more purely intellectual, method).
Furthermore, as the physical world expands, mathematical necessities constrain what
is possible.   Although “constrain” cannot be read strictly causally, as if theorems can
literally exert force on physical things to behave in certain ways, the “constraints” have
visible consequences or “make a difference” in the world of causes, in such a way as to
call in question the minimalist’s earlier contention that uninstantiated properties have no
causal  effect.   For  example,  the  mathematical  theorem  that  there  is  no  continuous
function from the circle to the real numbers that is increasing all the way round the circle
means that it is impossible to build a spiral staircase that goes up all the way round and
comes back to where it started – at any point, it may go up, but not at all points.25  The
famous Escher drawings that appear to show such things happening are impossible to
realize, and no change in the laws of nature would make them possible.  The physical,
causal  world is  constrained by the mathematical  world.   If  “causality  is  the mark of
being”,  power over the causal realm should also be a mark of being.  The close link
between uninstantiated properties and what can happen in physical reality again suggests
a maximalist, semi-Platonist but not fully Platonist view of the uninstantiated.
3.
Determinables and determinates: extrapolating reality  A way in to the realm of
properties  beyond the  here  and  now is  provided  by the  theory  of  determinables  and
determinates.  The normal reason we know about uninstantiated universals such as huge
numbers is that they occur in structured ranges of universals called determinables.  Color
is a determinable, while an exact shade of color such as Cambridge Blue is a determinate
– a precise way of being a color, among the wide range of possible ways of being a color.
(“Blue” is thus a range of determinate colors – color partly but not fully determined.)
Similarly with quantities: length is a determinable, 1.57 metres a determinate length.
The way in which determinables are divided into determinates is unlike the way in
which classification works via genus and differentia.  While (in the traditional example)
25 James Franklin, Global and local, Mathematical Intelligencer 36 (4) (Dec 2014), 4-9.
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humans are of the genus animal with the differentia of rationality added, Cambridge Blue
is not color with some differentia added (other than Cambridge Blue itself).  It is just one
of the different ways of being colored.26
While  it  is  possible  that  a  determinable  should  divide  into  a  discrete  mass  of
unrelated determinates – the space of smells has something of that character, though not
exactly – in the most important cases such as color and quantity, the determinates are
subject to continuous variation.  Colors resemble closely or not, and between two colors
there is a range of intermediate colors.27  Similarly for lengths.  To all appearances, ranges
of colors and lengths are infinitely divisible, although it is for empirical science to say if
the appearance corresponds exactly to reality.
Facts about the relations between the determinates of a determinable,  such as the
betweenness relations holding among the colors or among the ratios in which lengths
stand, appear to be necessary.  Surely there is no possible world in which a given shade of
blue is between scarlet and vermilion, or in which A is twice the length of B, B twice the
length of C and A three times the length of C?  (It is much harder to say if the nomic
connections  between  properties,  such  as  the  proportionality  of  gravity  to  mass,  are
necessary in such a strong sense, or “empirically necessary”, whatever that might mean,
or contingent.28)
It  would  be  possible  in  principle  for  our  perception  to  register  some  individual
determinates without noticing that they formed instances of the range of a determinable.
That is not what actually happens.  Our sense organs respond continuously, and no doubt
imprecisely, to ranges of colors and lengths, and we recognize the variation explicitly,
and that it is variation within a single determinable.  As a result, we have an ability to
interpolate and extrapolate, to imagine colors and lengths close to but distinct from those
experienced.  That gives us prima facie reason to believe in the reality, in some sense, of
colors and lengths other than those we have directly experienced.
That is the epistemology.  What of the ontology?  To be specific, if some shade of
blue were uninstantiated,  it  would still  lie  between whatever  other  shades  it  does  lie
26 William Ernest Johnson, Logic, Part I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921), ch. 11; survey in 
David H. Sanford, “Determinates vs determinables,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2002, revised 
2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinate-determinables/.
27 The structure of the space of colors surveyed in Jonathan Cohen, “On the structural properties of the 
colours,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003), 78-95.
28 Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, 257-62; Vlastimil Vohánka, “Are standard lawlike propositions 
metaphysically necessary? Hildebrand vs. Groarke,” Studia Neoaristotelica 11 (1) (2014), 89-133.
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between.29  It could “make a difference”, for example in creating a perceived jump in a
smoothly-varying perceived range of blues.  What exactly is the Aristotelian account of
the reality (if any) of a shade of blue that happens never to have been instantiated?
Brent  Mundy argues for the reality  of uninstantiated  universals  by asking how a
general theory of quantity relates to empirical evidence about quantities.  A nominalist
theory faces the problem that standard postulates of the theory of (extensive) quantity
such as that the sum of two quantities is a quantity are literally false (for example, if mass
means, operationally, measurement in a balance, then two large enough masses may be
too large to fit together in a balance, though they do fit individually).  That problem is
shared by an Aristotelian realism that admits only instantiated quantities: the sum of two
instantiated  lengths  and  the  average  of  two  shades  of  blue  may  not  be  instantiated.
Mundy suggests that for a posteriori realism – one which takes it as a matter for science
to determine which universals there are – the empirical evidence supports the reality of
the determinable as such rather than of the arbitrary collection of those determinates that
happen to be instantiated.  On grounds of theoretical simplicity, length-in-general is the
theoretical  entity  that  makes  sense  of  the  empirical  evidence,  not  lengths-in-the-
happenstancedly-instantiated-range.30  To restrict  lengths  or  colors  to  the  instantiated
range would be a “simplification” analogous to supposing that only observed bodies exist
– it fails to posit the natural range of which the data happen to be a sample.  One expects
the science of color to be able to deal with any uninstantiated shades of blue that there
may be on a par with instantiated shades – of course direct experimental evidence can
only be of instantiated shades, but science consists not just of heaps of experimental data
but  of  inference  from  experiment,  so  extrapolation  (or  interpolation)  arguments  are
possible to “fill in” gaps between experimental results.  That is in principle no different
from using interpolation to estimate the orbit of a planet between observations.
29 Hume’s example of the “missing shade of blue” (Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed 
revised, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, 6) concerns epistemology (how can our imagination fill in an 
unexperienced shade of blue which lies between two experienced ones?), but the example is adapted here to
ontology.
30 Brent Mundy, “The metaphysics of quantity,” Philosophical Studies 51 (1987), 29-54; Mundy calls his 
position “naturalistic Platonism”, but it is identical to the Aristotelian realism with uninstantiated universals
that is defended here. It resembles Tooley’s “factual Platonic realism” (Causation, 119). This is not the 
same position as “naturalized Platonism”, which holds that a naturalized epistemology can allow for 
knowledge of abstract objects: Mark Balaguer, “Against (Maddian) naturalized Platonism,” Philosophia 
Mathematica 2 (1994), 97-108; Bernard Linsky and Edward N. Zalta, “Naturalized Platonism versus 
Platonized naturalism,” Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995), 525-555.
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Similarly,  Brian  Ellis  points  out  that  laws  of  nature  typically  do  not  connect
individual  values  of  “dimensions”  or  “generic  universals”,  such  as  mass,  but  the
dimensions  themselves.   They  express  “concomitant  variation”,  in  Mill’s  phrase,  or
“generic  relations  between  the  quantitative  properties  of  things”,  that  is,  relations
between ranges of, for example, depth and pressure, or distance and gravitational force,
or  reflected  wavelength  and  perceived  color.   So  science  suggests  that  it  is  the
determinable  rather than the determinates  or values that  are  ontologically  prior, since
laws connect determinables in the first instance.31
The fact that laws typically connect ranges of determinables raises a further problem
for  minimalist  Aristotelianism.   That  theory  makes  much  of  the  causal  powers  of
properties  as  evidence  for  their  existence.  It  regards  laws  of  nature  as  connections
between properties, that being a prime argument against the Humean regularity theory of
laws: the ability of a law, unlike a mere regularity, to support a counterfactual such as “If
a  new planet  were  at  a  certain  distance  from the  sun,  it  would  experience  a  certain
gravitational force” is a reason for favoring a property-connection view of laws.  But that
means the law itself must have an ability to “project” into the non-existent, or realm of
pure possibles, which on a minimalist Aristotelian view it seems not to have. For it seems
that if enough values of the determinable ceased to exist, the law itself would go out of
existence.32  If the world consisted of two atoms at a fixed distance, exerting the usual
gravitational force on each other, then (on a minimalist Aristotelian view), Newton’s law
of gravity would not exist in that world and the actual gravitational force would not be an
instance of it,  as there is  no range of values  for the law to connect.   If  there is  any
gravitational law in that world, it can only connect properties that actually hold in that
world: it could at most hold “Any two atoms at that exact distance would exert that exact
force.”  Hence there would be no counterfactuals supported by that law, such as what
forces  would  obtain  if  there  were  more  atoms  or  variable  distances.   That  seems
counterintuitive,  as  the  proposed world  is  just  a  sample  of  the  possible  instances  of
Newton’s law.
31 Brian Ellis, “The categorical dimensions of the causal powers,” in Alexander Bird, Brian D. Ellis and 
Howard Sankey, eds, Properties, Powers and Structures: Issues in the metaphysics of realism (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 11-26, section 3.
32 Swoyer and Orilia, “Properties,” section 5.1.2. Similar problems with uninstantiated laws that 
nevertheless appear to be true are raised in Tooley, Causation, 113-20.
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Thus,  the  lack  of  instantiation  of  some –  even  many  –  determinate  values  of  a
determinable does not tell against the reality of the determinable in general.
It  is  the  same  with  mathematical  structures  such  as  the  continuum,  Euclidean
geometry or infinite numbers and idealizations such as perfect spheres.  Those can be
described as (possibly) uninstantiated structures or as (merely) possible structures, but in
either case they are complex forms which could be instantiated in reality – forms about
which  there  can  be  necessary  knowledge.   They  differ  from the  Forms  of  classical
Platonism  which  necessarily  lie  beyond  mundane  reality  and  cannot  be  literally
instantiated in it.  Aristotelian forms can be instantiated, but it is for the contingencies of
historical  reality  (or the will  of God, or whatever decides  such matters)  to determine
which are in fact instantiated.
4. 
Possibles by recombination?  We return to the problem of whether a minimalist,
this-worldly Aristotelian realism can provide truthmakers for the objective truths about
uninstantiated properties, such as the truth that three times any ratio lies between two and
four times that ratio.  Because of the tendency of quantity to apply across vast ranges of
size,  it  is  particularly  difficult  to  make  sense  of  quantity  in  terms  of  an Aristotelian
realism that does not in some way admit uninstantiated universals.  The challenge is to
explain the truthmakers of truths about the world beyond physical actuality, in terms of
facts strictly about the instantiated properties (and particulars). 
Minimalist  Aristotelians  such  as  Armstrong  argue  that  admitting  uninstantiated
universals in any way at all would be excessively Platonist, as acknowledging a realm of
Forms beyond the real world, ungrounded in any true reality.33  They must say, then, that
lengths greater than the diameter of the universe or uninstantiated shades of blue are mere
possibilities.  The difficulty for that suggestion is that “merely” possible lengths appear
themselves to stand in ratios to each other, in ways correctly described by mathematics,
and an uninstantiated shade of blue appears to lie between two determinate instantiated
ones.   The “mere”  possibilities  thus themselves  form a Platonic-like world of forms,
33 David M. Armstrong, Universals: An opinionated introduction (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 75-
82.
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complex in structure, the truths of which have no apparent truthmaker.  Our knowledge of
ratios,  such as that  three times a  length lies between two and four times that  length,
applies to lengths beyond the diameter of the universe.  Those truths stand ready to be, so
to speak, clothed in reality if the universe expands.
One  might  initially  hope  to  rely  on  modal  logic,  with  contingent,  instantiated
properties taking the causal load and the modal tasks being left to logic.  But that seems
hopeless in the cases at hand, since the necessities of the betweenness relations among
colors or ratios appear to be in no way logical.  While there is no consensus as to where
the boundary between logic and non-logic lies, betweenness relations are far from that
boundary, on the non-logical side.
The most determined attempt to meet the challenge of reducing truths of possibility
to actualities is the combinatorial theory of possibility of David Armstrong.  Armstrong
holds that possibilities are recombinations of actual elements in the world – there being a
unicorn is possible because it is a recombination of parts of actually existing entities.
That is intended as a reductive account of possibility: there is no appeal to other concepts
of possibility, such as those of modal logic.
In this  theory, combination  is  to  allow addition  and deletion  of  actually  existing
particulars (though not addition of universals): “Combination is to be understood widely.
It includes the notion of expansion (perhaps ‘repetition’ is a less misleading term) and
also contraction.”34  Individuals are to be allowed to clone themselves indefinitely, indeed
infinitely often, to create new possibilities.
The difficulty is that the possibility of very large or infinite numbers is then built into
the theory, or presupposed by it, rather than analyzed by it.  Why are numbers larger than
those instantiated in the universe possible?  Because the actual individuals in the universe
are subject to “indefinite multiplication”.35  (Similarly, the possibility of a length greater
than the diameter of the universe is grounded in the possibility of replication of actual
individuals  to  give  a  body  of  greater  total  length:  an  uninstantiated  quantity  is
“combinatorially  accessible  from actual”  quantities.36)  But what is  the ground of the
possibility of indefinite replication of individuals itself?  The theory does not say.  Instead
34 David M. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 37.
35 Armstrong, Combinatorial Theory, 125.
36 Armstrong, Combinatorial Theory, 56.
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it has to assume that possibility in order to get started.37  What, for example, is the ground
of the possibility  of some particular infinite cardinal?   It is the possibility that actual
individuals should be infinitely replicated at least that many times (a possibility normally
regarded  as  controversial,  in  view  of  traditional  Aristotelian  doubts  about  actual
infinities).  That may indeed be the ground, but the combinatorial theory of possibility
has not given an analysis of that possibility, only an assertion of it.  So the combinatorial
theory  is  not  a  complete  account  of  possibility.  In  particular  it  has  not  given,  as  it
claimed to do, a reductive analysis of uninstantiated universals in terms of instantiated
ones.
That is not the only problem for the recombination theory of possibility.  For a start,
an uninstantiated shade of blue may be an average of instantiated shades, but an average
is  not  a  recombination  of  existing  entities,  whether  particulars  or  properties.   More
importantly, the recombination theory relies on two substantial metaphysical theses about
possibility, which call in question its status as a complete, reductive, theory of possibility
(as  is  needed  if  it  is  to  accomplish  the  task  of  providing this-world  truthmakers  for
counterfactuals about uninstantiated properties).  If it is asked why all recombinations of
actually-existing elements should be considered possible, the answer lies in an appeal to
Hume’s principle of “no necessary connections between distinct existences.”38  That is
what licences the compossiblity of any recombination of actuals.  But that is a principle
doubtfully  true  –  it  is  very  difficult  to  define  an  unambiguous  version  of  it  that  is
simultaneously  not  subject  to  obvious  counterexample,  reasonably  in  accord  with
intuition, and non-trivial.39  Indeed, prima facie, betweenness relations among colors and
among  ratios  are  clear  counterexamples,  since  colors  and  ratios  are  existences  and
betweenness relations are necessary connections.  Even if Hume’s principle is true, it is a
substantial and non-obvious metaphysical thesis about necessity and possibility, hence an
obstacle to the claim that a reductive account of possibility has been given.
The second substantial thesis relied on by Armstrong is that existence for a property
means timeless existence – a property is said to exist if it is instantiated at  some time.40
Without that thesis, Armstrong would have even fewer properties existing, and it would
37 Armstrong, Combinatorial Theory, 58-60.
38 Armstrong, Combinatorial Theory, 115-7; Armstrong actually argues from combinatorialism to Hume’s 
principle.
39 Jessica Wilson, “What is Hume’s dictum, and why believe it?” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 80 (2010), 595-637.
40 Armstrong, Combinatorial Theory, 70.
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be very easy for properties and laws to go out of existence, removing even more of the
truthmakers needed to support counterfactuals.  Yet the thesis of timeless existence relies
on  a  controversial  metaphysics  of  space-time,  which  contradicts  the  metaphysics  of
presentism (the theory that only the present exists)  believed in by the folk and some
philosophers.41  Surely it is a weakness for a theory as general as the metaphysics of
properties to have to rely on so special a thesis as the negation of presentism.
The discussion has so far been confined to “tame” uninstantiated universals which lie
in ranges of partially-instantiated determinates.  It is true that there may be uninstantiated
properties  that  are  not  in  ranges  of  determinables  of  which  some  determinates  are
instantiated.  They would be truly “alien” universals, which are like nothing in the actual
universe.42  However, these seem beyond the range of what needs to considered in science
and  mathematics  –  for  all  the  vast  size  and  esoteric  nature  of  Hilbert  spaces  and
inaccessible infinite cardinals, they are in some sense made out of a small range of simple
properties.  Alien universals would be neither ruled in nor out, but as we seem to have no
possible knowledge of them, it may be allowable to excuse all sides in the debate from
giving an account of them.
5.
Semi-Platonist Aristotelianism  The Aristotelian slogan is that universals are in re:
in the things themselves (as opposed to in a Platonic heaven).  For the reasons just given,
it would not do to be too fundamentalist about that dictum, especially when it comes to
uninstantiated  universals  such  as  numbers  bigger  than  the  number  of  things  in  the
universe.  How big the universe is, or what colors actually appear on real things, is surely
a  contingent  matter,  whereas  at  least  some  truths  about  universals  appear  to  be
independent of whether they are instantiated.
At  this  point  it  may  be  wondered  whether  it  is  not  a  very  Platonist  form  of
Aristotelianism that is being defended here.   It has a structured space of universals, not
all instantiated, into whose necessary interconnections the soul has insights.  That is so.
41 John Bigelow, “Presentism and properties,” Noûs 30 (Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives 10) 
(1996), 35-52.
42 David M. Armstrong, Truth and Truthmakers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 86-89.
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But  there  are  three,  not  two,  distinct  positions  covered  by the  names  Platonism and
Aristotelianism:
 (Extreme)  Platonism,  according  to  which  universals  are  of  their  nature
“abstract objects”, that is, they are not the kind of entities that could exist
(fully or exactly) in this world, and they lack causal power
 Semi-Platonist  or  modal  or  maximalist43 Aristotelianism  (the  position
defended here), according to which universals can exist and be perceived to
exist in this world and often do, but it is a contingent matter which do so
exist, and we can have knowledge even of those that are uninstantiated and of
their necessary interrelations
 Strict  this-worldly  or  minimalist  Aristotelianism,  according  to  which
uninstantiated universals do not exist in any way: all universals really are in
re
Those three positions are very distinct.  The gap between semi-Platonist Aristotelianism
and extreme Platonism is unbridgeable.  Aristotelian universals are ones that could be in
real things (even if some of them happen not to be), and knowledge of them comes from
the senses being affected by instantiated universals (even if indirectly and via inference,
so that knowledge can be of universals beyond those directly experienced).  By contrast,
extreme  Platonism calls  universals  “abstract”,  meaning  that  they  do  not  have  causal
powers or location and hence cannot be perceived (but can only be postulated or inferred
by argument, or perhaps communed with by intuition).
It is true that whether the gap between the second and third positions is large depends
on what account one gives of possibilities.  If the minimalist “this-worldly” Aristotelian
were to have a robust view of merely possible properties (for example, by granting full
existence  to  possible  worlds),  there  might  be  little  difference  in  the  two  kinds  of
Aristotelianism.  But that would be to adopt Platonism about possible worlds.  Supposing
a deflationary view of possibilities (as would be expected from an Aristotelian and as is
developed  in  Armstrong’s theory),  a  this-worldly  Aristotelian  will  believe  in  a  much
narrower realm of real entities.
A further consideration of mathematical entities will clarify the relation between the
second  (semi-Platonist  Aristotelian)  and  third  (strictly  minimalist  earthbound
43 In the language of Swoyer and Orilia, section 5.
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Aristotelian)  positions,  which  disagree  on  whether  to  admit  in  some way necessities
concerning uninstantiated universals.  The discrepancy is not a matter of great urgency in
considering the usual universals of science which are known to be instantiated because
they cause perception of themselves.  It is the gargantuan and esoteric specimens in the
zoo  of  the  higher  mathematics  that  strike  fear  into  the  strict  empirically-oriented
Aristotelian realist.  Our knowledge of mathematical entities that are not or may not be
instantiated has always been a leading reason for believing in Platonism, and rightly so,
since it is knowledge that goes well beyond the here and now. It does create insuperable
difficulties for a strict this-worldly Aristotelianism.  But it needs to be considered whether
one might move only partially in the Platonist direction.  There is room to move only
halfway towards extreme Platonism for the same reason that there is space in the blue
spectrum  between  two  instantiated  shades  for  an  uninstantiated  shade.   The  non-
adjacency of shades of blue is a necessary fact about the blue spectrum (as Platonism
holds), but whether an intermediate shade of blue is instantiated is contingent (contrary to
extreme Platonism, which holds that universals cannot be literally instantiated in reality
at all).  It is the same with uninstantiated mathematical structures, according to the semi-
Platonist  Aristotelian:  a  ratio  (say)  whether  small  and  instantiated  or  huge  and
uninstantiated,  is  part  of  a  necessary  spectrum of  ratios  (as  Platonists  think)  but  an
instantiated ratio is literally a relation between two actual (say) lengths (as Aristotelians
think) and is thus something found in the physical world.  The fundamental reason why
an  intermediate  position  between  extreme  Platonism  and  extreme  Aristotelianism  is
possible is that the Platonist insight that there is knowledge of uninstantiated universals is
compatible  with  the  Aristotelian  insight  that  instantiated  universals  can  be  directly
perceived in things.
The  slogan  of  semi-Platonist  Aristotelianism is  “Instantiation  is  possible  but  not
necessary.”
6.
What reality do uninstantiated properties  have?  What  reality  does  the semi-
Platonist or maximalist Aristotelian attribute to uninstantiated properties?  Should they be
said to “exist”?  The minimalist Aristotelian has a simple answer to that question: they do
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not exist at all.  The Platonist also has an intelligible though dubious answer: they exist
fully, but as abstract objects, which are necessary beings in a different kind of world from
the  physical  one.   The  semi-Platonist  Aristotelian’s  story  is  not  so  clear.   Are
uninstantiated properties to have a shadowy half-being, somewhere between full being
and  mere  possibility?   Or  do  they  need  to  reside  as  ideas  in  the  mind  of  God,  as
Augustine and Aquinas thought?44
Those are not regarded as meaningful questions by the semi-Platonist Aristotelian.
When a universal is instantiated by a particular in some state of affairs, a being exists
with that universal; when a universal is not instantiated, there are knowable possibilities
concerning it  and its  relations to other universals,  but there is  no need to grant it  an
“existence” parallel  to that  of particulars.   That  would be to adopt a  fundamentalism
about properties, reifying them as if they paralleled particulars.  As even Armstrong says,
“it  is  wrong  to  substantialize universals;”  they  are  ways  things  are,  not  things
themselves.45  (Perhaps it would be better to say “ways of being things”, to avoid the
apparent existential import of “ways things are” – in the same way as “unicorn” merely
describes a kind of animal without implying that such animals exist, so “ways of being
things”  is  intended  to  describe  a  kind  of  reality,  prescinding  from  their  existence.)
Neither bare particulars nor properties “exist” in the same straightforward sense as do the
particulars-with-properties that we come across in our world, even though they are part of
the reality of those “substances”.
A realist but anti-fundamentalist approach to uninstantiated properties is supported
by two thought experiments.
If  there  were  a  major  ontological  difference  between  a  property’s  being
uninstantiated  and  being  instantiated  (but  not  between  its  being  singly  and  doubly
instantiated), then an oddity would arise if a universe were cloned.  Suppose a universe in
which a certain property is instantiated once.  Clone that universe, with the two universes
having no causal or other connection.  Now delete the instantiation of the property in one
of the universes (say, “ours”).  The instantiation of the property in the other universe
should not be able to do any ontological  work in our universe, since that universe is
totally disconnected from ours in all ways.  For all intents and purposes, our universe is
as if the property is uninstantiated; for example, it exerts no causal power in our universe.
44 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae bk 1 q. 15 art. 1.
45 Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, 30.
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Is it, in some absolute sense, instantiated?  There seems to be no fact of the matter: to
claim there is would be to take a fundamentalist view of properties as if they obeyed the
same rules as substances.
A second thought experiment is suggested by the theory that properties, instantiated
or not, might exist as ideas in the mind of God.  If they did so exist,  they would be
subject to a Euthyphro problem similar to that for moral laws: does God have the idea
that orange lies between red and yellow because orange really does lie between red and
yellow, or  does  orange lie  between red and yellow because  God has  the  idea  that  it
should?  The comparison suggests a parallel between possibly uninstantiated properties
and moral laws.  Suppose one takes an absolutely objectivist view of moral laws: those
laws are true prior to any human (perhaps even divine) choice, action or command, and
absolutely constrain all human decisions (constrain them ethically, of course, not causally
or logically).  Those human actions that are right implement or instantiate the laws; for
example,  a just  action  gives  to  someone what  the laws insist  he deserves.   However
objectivist one is about the laws, there is little temptation to reify them, to posit them as
substances, to regard the Ten Commandments as written in the firmament, or to wonder
about  the  ontological  difference  between  instantiation  and  non-instantiation.   Their
reality, powerful as it is, is not like that.
The laws of morality provide a model for the laws of nature and the properties which
the laws connect.  They are real and constrain substances, but they are not themselves
substances – not physical substances, and not abstract objects either.  The reality of the
ways things are is not the reality of things.  It is the reality of their own kind.
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